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Chapter 54: From Keynes to Friedman via Mints: a Resolution of the Dispute
Robert Leeson
14 August 2002
1. The Keynes Before Keynes
Milton Friedman (chapter 2 [1956], 3-4) asserted that “Chicago was one of the few
academic centres at which the quantity theory continued to be a central and vigorous
part of the oral tradition throughout the 1930’s and 1940’s”. Friedman sought to
“nurture” the revival of the quantity theory by linking it to this Chicago “oral
tradition”. According to Friedman the “flavor” of this oral tradition was captured in a
model in which the quantity theory was “in the first instance a theory of the demand
for money”. Friedman added that to “the best of my knowledge no systematic
statement of this theory as developed at Chicago exists, though much of it can be read
between the lines of [Henry] Simons’ and [Lloyd] Mints’s writings”. He also enlisted
the names of Frank Knight and Jacob Viner in support of his assertion.
It is inherently difficult to resolve a dispute over an oral tradition that may or may not
have existed decades before. Friedman began his Chicago graduate studies in autumn
1932, and his primary exposure to Chicago monetary economics was through Mints’
Graduate Study of Money and Banking course (Economics 330).i Don Patinkin
carefully marshalled evidence from his own Chicago lecture notes (taken from Mints’
Economics 330 in summer 1944) and from contemporary Chicago writings and thesis
titles. Patinkin (chapter 6 [1972/1974], 115-6; chapter 5 [1969/1981], 246-7)
concluded that Friedman’s use of the quantity theory differed significantly from
interwar Chicago usage: “the basic assumption of the Chicago School analysis was
that the velocity of circulation is unstable”. Simons’ writings (beginning in 1933)
“represent the Chicago tradition in its pristine – and pre-Keynesian – form”. With
respect to the demand function for money, Patinkin (chapter 6 [1972/1974], 115)
asserted that Simons “never even mentioned this concept!”ii However, Simons (1948
[1946], 340, n4) stated that “Empirical evidence as to secular increases in the demand
for money or liquidity is, however, a precarious basis for long term policy”.
Patinkin (chapter 5 [1969/1981], 249) concluded that “by the 1940s the Chicago
School had – quite understandably – been influenced by Keynesian monetary theory”.
The relevant doctoral theses of the period “generally took [John Maynard] Keynes as
their point of departure”. Mints (1950) analysed the asset demand for money – but
this analysis, Patinkin explained, was followed by “a special appendix on Keynes’
theory of liquidity preference”. On two occasions, Patinkin (chapter 5 [1969/1981],
256; chapter 19 [1986], 120) used Friedman’s (chapter 4 [1968], 439) reference to the
modern reformulated quantity theory as having been “strongly affected by the
Keynesian analysis of liquidity preference” as evidence that Friedman has been
obliged to retreat from his original position. Thus Michael Parkin (chapter 18 [1986])
was represented as “more Friedmanian than Friedman” for not accepting this as a
“fact”.
However, as Herbert Stein (1969, 133) put it, there was a “Keynes Before Keynes”.
Lauchlin Currie (1972, 139, 141) considered himself “a Keynesian from way back …
my theoretical approach had been influenced by Keynes since my London School of
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Economics days in 1922-25”. Currie (13 June 1979) informed Patinkin that in the
early 1930s he was “using the Treatise in classes at Harvard”.iii Erik Lundberg (1994
[1934], 48, 51-2, 62) recalled that in Chicago in 1931-2, “Our speeches and
discussions centred around the monetary formulations of the business cycles given by
Hayek, Mises and Keynes … I dare say the Keynesian side mostly won the battles”.
1933 cannot be characterised as “pre-Keynesian” in so far as the demand for money is
concerned because that framework was already present in the Treatise on Money
published in 1930. Patinkin (chapter 16 [1981/1973], 282) “strongly suspected” that
the Chicago “classroom teaching” of the 1940s “differed” from “that of a decade
before” in some respects – but he apparently made no attempt to inspect Friedman’s
1932 Economics 330 lecture notes.
These 1932 lecture notes indicate that Friedman was exposed to a version of the
quantity theory which stressed the importance of the demand for money. Moreover,
this version of the quantity theory was stated to be part of a (Cambridge) oral
tradition. In 1932, Mints’ placed great stress on Keynes’ Treatise on Money (1930)
and to a lesser extent on Keynes’ Tract on Monetary Reform (1923) in which this
Marshallian oral tradition was discussed. In response to Patinkin, Friedman (chapter
7 [1972/1974], 168; see also 1967, 8-9) maintained that “Keynes’s discussion of the
demand curve for money in the General Theory is for the most part a continuation of
earlier quantity theory approaches, improved and refined but not basically modified.
As evidence, I shall cite Keynes’s own writings in the Tract on Monetary Reform
(1923) – long before he became a Keynesian in the present sense”. But like Patinkin,
Friedman did not refer to his 1932 lecture notes.
This chapter uses these lecture notes to resolve this long-standing dispute about the
nature of inter-war Chicago monetary economics. To avoid ambiguity, section 2 of
this chapter provides a precise description of the aspects of the debate that can be
regarded as resolved. Section 3 examines the existing literature (including Patinkin’s
work) which emphasised that the demand for money framework was, to a large
extent, already present in the Treatise. Sections 4, 5 and 6 describe the transmission
process of the quantity theory money demand approach from Keynes to Friedman via
Mints. Section 4 examines the interactions between Keynes and the participants of
the Harris Foundation lectures and seminars at the University of Chicago in 1931.
Section 5 specifically examines the interaction between Keynes and Mints in Chicago
in 1931. Section 6 examines Friedman’s 1932 Economics 330 lecture notes and
readings: 6.1 the course outline, 6.3 Friedman’s readings and lecture notes and 6.3 the
reviews of the Treatise. Section 7 outlines Friedman’s defence against Patinkin.
Concluding comments are provided in section 8.
2. Issues Resolved and Issues Not Resolved
Since this essay purports to resolve this dispute it may be helpful to summarise the six
issues that can be regarded as having being resolved (2.1-2.6). No conclusive
evidence, however, is offered with respect to Viner, Knight, Simons or Douglas (2.7).
2.1 First, the documentary evidence clearly indicates that in 1932-3 Mints organised
Economics 330 around Keynes’ Treatise. The first words that Friedman wrote were
“Econ 330 Keynes”. Friedman then wrote that Mints concluded that “General
Framework of Keynes likely to endure much longer than details”.
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2.2 Secondly, within a few years the framework of the Treatise on Money had been
replaced by the framework of what Arthur F. Burns (1946, 12) described as Keynes’
“treatise on unemployment equilibrium”. When Burns wrote that in the “last decade
the world has moved swiftly in a Keynesian direction” he was, of course, referring to
the General Theory as the “Keynesian” framework that endured. As Kenneth
Boulding (1956, 141) put it, the 1936 Keynesian Revolution was “the Great Change
in economics”.
In the process, the Treatise came to be viewed as a stepping-stone in the “natural
evolution” of Keynes’ (1936, vi) thought. After 1936, much of the theoretical
apparatus of the Treatise was “discarded” (Boulding 1956, 133). Alvin Hansen
(1936, 668, 686) in his Journal of Political Economy (JPE) review of the General
Theory, noted that Keynes had now “wholly abandoned … the imposing edifice
erected in a Treatise on Money”. Hansen described economics as standing “in danger
of a sterile orthodoxy”; but the General Theory would “stimulate thinking on fresh
lines in the field of economic dynamics”.
Roger Weiss (1 July 1987) wrote to Mints (on the occasion of his 100th birthday) to
remind him that for post-1936 students “you worked your way patiently through the
General Theory”.iv By the time Patinkin attended Mints’ Economics 330 - in 1944 the General Theory - not the Treatise - dominated monetary theory. Mints apparently
devoted one lecture (17 July 1944) to deriving the fundamental equations of the
Treatise, and a part of a lecture (19 July 1944) to Keynes’ discussion of the market
and natural rates of interest. Mints concluded his discussion with “By now concept of
‘natural rate’ pretty well evaporated”.v
Keynes (1936, v) apologised in advance if his “controversy is itself too keen”. The
controversy over the Keynesian framework of the General Theory became more
intense after the publication of Friedman’s (1956) Studies in the Quantity Theory of
Money, until this alternative Chicago framework evolved into the “natural” rate
counter-revolution and displaced its Keynesian competitor (Friedman 1968). Even
before this counter-revolution, Roy Harrod (1951, 404) noted that the publication of
General Theory “greatly militated against the reading of the Treatise”. One of
Keynes’ American popularisers described the Treatise as being “confined to a
pretentious monetary theory of the trade cycle” (Dillard 1948, 310).
2.3 Thirdly, one of the novel features of Keynes’ work in the Treatise was an
increased emphasis on money demand in a revised quantity theory framework. Like
his followers (including Patinkin), Keynes (1936, 343-4) sought “a genuine synthesis”
– but Keynes’ emphasis, in this context, was the synthesis between the “twin quantity
theories” one of which sought to determine the price level (or “value in exchange”)
and the other which sought to determine the rate of interest (or the “value in use”).
This specific synthesis was, as Friedman put it, “a continuation of earlier quantity
theory approaches, improved and refined but not basically modified”. Patinkin (16
November 1959) complained to Friedman that “to me it seems that with perhaps one
exception (Karl Schlesinger) an exposition with the contents and spirit of yours could
not have been written (and was not written) before Keynes. I find it particularly
difficult to accept your implication that your essay represents the kind of thing that
was taught at Chicago by Knight, Viner, Simons and Mints. My own recollections
are different”.vi Friedman’s 1956 essay could not have been written (and was not
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written) before Keynes of the Treatise – but the publication of that book preceded
Friedman’s training at Chicago.
2.4 Fourthly, there was an important generational aspect to this dispute. As Stein
(1969, 162) noted, both Paul Samuelson and Boulding responded to Keynes with
“Wordsworthian or Keatian emotions”. Both described their feelings using the words
“Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive, but to be young was very heaven”. Samuelson
(1915-) was describing his reaction to the General Theory; Boulding (1910-95) was
describing his reaction to the Treatise. Both were twenty-one when they encountered
these respective books. Friedman (1912-) was twenty when he attended Mints’ 330
course; Patinkin (1922-95) was twenty-two.
Boulding (1956, 133) recalled that he would “never forget the excitement, as an
undergraduate [at Oxford] of reading Keynes’ Treatise on Money in 1931”. He
recounted to his biographer that the Treatise provoked “a spiritual experience as well
an intellectual one … now the world made sense; history made sense for the first
time” [emphasis in original]. One of the unpleasant shocks he received upon taking
up his first teaching position was that in Edinburgh, in autumn 1934, “Keynes had
scarcely been heard of” (Kerman 1974, 104-5, 242).
Boulding spent the intervening period (1932-4) as a graduate student at Chicago.vii
He was not impressed with much of the formal teaching but wrote to a friend “There
are a large number of Bright Young Men in the graduate school. We meet every
week in a seminar to rend Mr Keynes” (cited by Kerman 1974, 236-7). George
Stigler (1988, 25) recalls that students and junior faculty “of whom Albert G. Hart
was the most prominent, organised a seminar and invited a stream of visiting scholars
(Oskar Lange and Fritz Machlup, among others) to give talks that led to remarkable
stimulating discussions”. Economics Chairman Harry Millis was prepared to
transform this seminar into a departmental course; but given the state of
“extraordinary intellectual ferment” that existed among the students, they declined for
fear that their autonomy might be undermined.
Friedman, Stigler, and Allen Wallis (1993) avidly discussed the idea they were
exposed to. Indeed, Milton and Rose Friedmans’ (1998, 35, 39-40) “most vivid
memory” of their fellow graduate students was Boulding and Hart vigorously
debating: “Both believed it was wasteful for only one person to talk at a time”.
Friedman (correspondence to the author, 15 February 2002) has reiterated that Boulding
was a dominant influence among graduate students at Chicago; a status that may have
been reinforced by his having already published in Keynes’ Economic Journal
(Boulding 1932).
Hart (1948, vii) located in John Hicks’ (1935) article on ‘A Suggestion for Simplifying
the Theory of Money’ the “most direct intellectual influence” on his own Money, Debt
and Economic Activity. Hicks (1935, 3) emphasised the marginal portfolio analysis in
the Treatise, as “the most important part of [Keynes’] theoretical contribution”. Hart
(1948, vii, 167) described Keynes as “the most fertile monetary thinker of the
interwar years”. The revolution in monetary thinking occurred during Hart’s time at
Chicago: “Down to the Great Depression of the 1930’s, the stability of velocity made
this mechanistic [quantity-velocity] approach reasonable”. However, with the
breakdown of the stability of velocity, it was necessary to analyse “people’s motives

5
and plans; and this is more conveniently carried out in the framework of the payments
approach and cash-balance approach”. In the chapter on “The Cash-Balances
Approach”, Hart (1948, 191-2) explained that “This chapter is about motives to hold
cash … [this] approach has a long history and has been widely used – particularly in
England … Among British economists of the twentieth century, Alfred Marshall,
A.C. Pigou, D.H. Robertson and J.M Keynes (in the earlier stages of his monetary
thinking) took this approach”. Hart (1948, viii) also stressed the influence of Mints
and Simons on his book.
It therefore seems likely that Friedman took the ideas he was exposed to in Economics
330 and used them as an organising framework with which to understand the
‘macroeconomic’ dislocation of the 1930s. If intense student discussion is admissible
as an “oral tradition” then Friedman’s assertion has some validity. A version of the
quantity theory which was “in the first instance a theory of the demand for money”
was apparently “a central and vigorous part of the oral tradition” at Chicago at least
among graduate students in 1932-3 (and possibly until the General Theory made
Keynes a suspect figure).
2.5 Fifhly, Friedman’s initial assertion about Chicago uniqueness in this context must
now appear unreliable. The Treatise made a profound impression on a variety of
economists in a variety of universities. John Kenneth Galbraith (1971, 280) spent
1931-4 at Berkeley where “Leo Rogin discussed Keynes with a sense of urgency that
made his seminars seem to graduate students the most important things then
happening in the world”. Boulding (1956, 133) had a similar sense of excitement at
Oxford in 1931. In summer 1930, A.F. Plumptre left Cambridge with a hundred proof
copies of the Treatise, from which he taught his University of Toronto students,
including Lorie Tarshis (1977, 49).viii When in 1932-3, Richard Kahn visited the
United States (including a four week visit to Chicago) he reported to Keynes that
“The Treatise plays an enormously prominent role wherever I go” (16 February 1933;
cited by Marcuzzo 2001, 22).
John Williams taught Money and Banking at Harvard (Mason 1982, 419). In his
forty-one page lead article review of the Treatise, Williams (1931, 549, 552-3, 559,
580) noted in the Quarterly Journal of Economics that Keynes was “turning away
from old versions of the quantity theory”. In Williams’ view, Keynes’ primary
innovation related to the composition of money demand: “a shift of deposits from
demand to time deposits”. Thus “the concept of the idle savings deposit, and the
consequent distinction between saving and investment, underlie Keynes’ whole
treatment and constitute a valid claim to his having broken new and significant
ground in monetary theory”. This was “an important advance. Fisher’s equation, for
example, deals exclusively with demand deposits. So far as I know all theories
previous to Keynes’ have failed to make use of the statistical division of deposits into
demand and time … in monetary terms, the crux of the matter is that, while banks
control the physical quantity of deposits, depositors control the spending of them, and
changes in quantity may be offset by changes in velocity or in direction”.
Joseph Schumpeter described the Treatise to Keynes (JMK XIII [1930], 201) as “a
Ricardian tour de force” and as a result tore up his own uncompleted work on
monetary theory (Moggridge 1992, 593). Erik Lundberg (1994 [1934], 48, 51-2, 62)
found that at Harvard in 1933, Schumpeter had “gathered around him a group of
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young economists all working with modern monetary theories. During the summer I
had discussions with some of them, especially on monetary questions concerning the
business cycle”. This contrasted favourably with what Lundberg found in Chicago in
1931-2. With respect to business cycle theory, Lundberg thought that Chicago had
“very little to offer. Professor Mints touched on some aspects of the problem in his
lectures on monetary theories”.
It is therefore improbable that the Treatise – with its emphasis on money demand –
informed ‘macroeconomic’ discussions in Chicago only. Indeed, Friedman in the
preface to these volumes has retreated from his initial assertion about Chicago
uniqueness. The chapters in Part 3 of this volume also tend to undermine the
uniqueness assertion.
2.6 There has been much speculation about Friedman’s motives. He was clearly
highly stimulated by the Chicago environment of the 1930s. His teachers “left a
unique imprint” on their students. In this Chicago tradition “what mattered in
intellectual discourse was only the cogency of the argument”. After his return to
Chicago in 1946, he self-consciously modelled his teaching style on Viner’s.
Friedman’s (chapter 2 [1956]) essay introduced a collection of dissertations written by
students from his Chicago Workshop in Money and Banking. The purpose was “to
supplement what I did with related work by students and colleagues. This
combination gave birth to what became known as the Chicago School of Monetary
Economics” (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 35, 156-7; Friedman 1983, 211; Stigler
1988, 156-7).
Friedman sought to provide an enthusiastic “teamwork approach” for his Workshop
(Hammond 1996, 47).ix His pedagogical mission was “to fuel intensive discussion”
(Friedman and Friedman 1998, 202, 35, 41, 49). But one energising ingredient,
present for Friedman’s generation, was missing for students of the 1950s: extreme
macroeconomic dislocation. The oral tradition linked the students of the secondgeneration Chicago School to their predecessors, thus assisting the cultivation of an
institutional affiliation.
Friedman (1962a, viii) thought that his role was to act as an intellectual
“matchmaker”. Some of his students found his “magic” comparable in excitement to
“a date with a beautiful woman” (Becker 1998).x If his ‘Restatement’ exaggerated the
degree of continuity with respect to earlier Chicago versions of the quantity theory
this may have been a rhetorical flourish designed to provide an additional
motivational stimulus to his students. Friedman (chapter 2 [1956], 21, 4) emphasised
“the part which students have played in keeping that tradition alive and vigorous”.
That tradition “nurtured” his students’ essays.
It was a highly successful pedagogical device. Not only did Friedman produce a
cohort of students committed to analysing macroeconomics through the quantity
theory,xi some such as Robert Lucas (1976, 41) and Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace
(1976, 169) constructed a third generation Chicago School “rules party”. So potent
was this teaching style that many others “picked up the Chicago business by osmosis”
(Bork 1983, 196). Stigler (1962, 71) claimed that Friedman was the intellectual
leader, not merely of the Chicago School, but of a much broader church: the
“Berkeley-Cambridge axis”.
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2.7 This chapter does not purport to offer decisive evidence with respect to Knight,
Simons, Viner or Douglas. Prior to 1936, these Chicago economists may have used
Keynes’ framework to analyse the Great Depression, orally, despite the paucity of
published references. Friedman’s cohort had extensive social and intellectual
interactions with their teachers (Stigler 1983, 168; 1988, 19; Friedman 1983, 179;
Wallis 1983, 179; Director 1983, 179; Minsky 1985, 220). Paul Douglas (1931, 9;
1933, 80) described the Treatise as “brilliant” and “The most stimulating single work
on money”. Viner (chapter 47 [1932], 504) concluded that the diagnoses and
remedies contained in Keynes’ Essays in Persuasion were widely accepted as
“substantially and brilliantly right”. Moreover, Keynes stood “head and shoulders”
above other economists as a “propagandist” whose work was “undiluted by academic
scruples to disclose all the qualifications and the uncertainties of his logical
argument”. Keynes also displayed “fearlessness in assigning to his opponents their
appropriately low intelligence quotas… Perhaps what the world has needed and most
urgently needs today, is a few more Keynes”. However, during a visit to Chicago,
Kahn (15th January 1933) reported to Joan Robinson that Viner was “very proud of
not having read more than a few passages from the Treatise”.xii
With respect to post-war published work, Viner, as Mints (1950, 116-7) pointed out,
was a “proponent of discretionary authority”. Viner (1947, 210-1) proposed that
“until better techniques are discovered, the problem of inflation and of deflation needs
to be dealt with by improvisation, by ad hoc and prompt reactions to changes in
circumstances as they occur rather than by fixed policies set long in advance in
accordance with long-run forecasts”.xiii Viner’s (1958 [1954], 365) use of the quantity
theory was different from that asserted by Friedman: he defended the quantity theory
against Schumpeter’s attacks, on the basis that the theory “is understood as holding
only: (1) that an authority powerful enough to make the quantity of money what it
pleases can so regulate that quantity as to make the price level approximate to what it
pleases, and (2) that the possibility of existence of such a power is not inconceivable a
priori”.
Friedman (1962) and Viner (1962) both contributed essays to In Search of a Monetary
Constitution. Viner’s contribution to the rules versus discretion debate was entitled
‘The Necessity and the Desirable Range of Discretion to be Allowed to a Monetary
Authority’. Viner concluded that it was impractical to conduct monetary management
“in conformity with a ‘rule’”, in part, because in the US “the degree of
decentralisation of direct and indirect control over the quantity and velocity of money,
as well as of official powers to influence the supply of near-moneys and their
velocities, is nothing short of fantastic” (1962, 273, 262; see also 1961, 232-3). Viner
(1962, 256-8, 261, 252) followed Simons in preferring the “flexible rule” and
“judgment” associated with a price-level goal, brought about by variations in the
money supply. Indeed, the bulk of Viner’s paper was a highly critical commentary of
Friedman’s x% money growth rule. Viner could not “exorcise” from his mind
Friedman’s “faith” and “claims”. In Friedman’s analysis “an improbable constancy is
being projected into the future … Staking our future on present prophesizing seems a
high price to pay for escaping from the bondage of a discretionary authority”.xiv
Knight (1964 [1948], xlv, xliii) also objected to the “whole project of making
monetary theory the centre and starting point of systematic economics” in part
because the “supply and demand curves for ‘liquidity’ have no solid foundation and
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are not a solid basis for action but are ‘theoretical’ in the bad and misleading sense”.xv
According to Knight (1941, 65) “that a monetary theory of interest should be
defended by economists of repute is especially mysterious in view of the facts, which
are directly contrary to what the theory calls for”. Knight explained that “The
monetary system can never be made automatic. An approximate constancy in general
prices, or in the relation between product prices and wages, can in the nature of the
case be achieved only by deliberate action, based on constant attention, correcting or
offsetting incipient tendencies to expansion or contraction”. In the rules versus
discretion debate over monetary policy, Knight (1960, 105) lent “rather strongly
towards the side of administrative discretion and judgement, being sceptical about
how far rules can be made in advance or especially how far they would be made
wisely by the agencies that would in fact make them”.
However, since this essay highlights the perils of the regression line approach to the
history of thought, no definitive judgement is offered with respect to Douglas, Knight,
Simons or Viner. Likewise no definitive judgement is offered with respect to Mints’
written work. Friedman’s primary exposure to monetary economics at Chicago was
through Mints’ 330: the evidence presented here is sufficient to absolve him of the
charges laid by Patinkin and Johnson. However, constraints of space and time
prohibit a systematic examination of these other aspects of the issue, which would, of
course, be a valuable contribution to the literature.
3. The Demand for Money prior to the General Theory
To Friedman’s students he displayed “the missionary’s zeal in the worship of truth”
(Becker 1991, 145). Patinkin (to Hicks 19 August 1957) also shared an “openminded search for the truth”.xvi Patinkin (chapter 5 [1969/1981], 242) sought to use
the “true nature of the Chicago monetary tradition” as a powerful weapon to attack
Friedman. But in a letter to Phillip Cagan commenting on his forthcoming
contribution to Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money (Cagan 1956), Patinkin (16th
May 1955) modestly acknowledged what he regarded as an intellectual weakness:
“seeing how my own thinking frequently gets compartmentalized – and fails to
recognize in one context what it recognizes in another”.xvii
What Patinkin apparently failed to adequately realise – in the compartment of his
dispute with Friedman - is that the General Theory created a structural break in
Chicagoan reactions to Keynes and that the concept of liquidity preference was
largely contained in the Treatise. The history of monetary economics – like the
Keynesian Neoclassical Synthesis - develops through “irony” and “error” (Patinkin
1952, 269-70).xviii
Patinkin (1981, 3, 16-7, 247, n17) was at Chicago between 1941-7, the last two years
as a doctoral student and research associate at the Cowles Commission. He used his
recollections of these years to further undermine Friedman’s assertion: “In so far as
the empirical estimation of the demand function for money was undertaken at
Chicago, it was done so under the auspices of the Keynesian model builders of the
Cowles Commission, which was then located at the University of Chicago. See in
particular Lawrence Klein [1947, 1950a]”. At Cowles “Truth in the form of
maximum-likelihood estimates identified and enthroned” battled “Error in the form of
simultaneous equation error … Armed with this truth Lawrence Klein developed his
econometric models of the United States economy (1947, 1950[a])”.
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In 1944, as Patinkin attended Mints’ Economics 330, Klein, supervised by
Samuelson, wrote his MIT doctoral dissertation on the Keynesian Revolution.
Patinkin (1981 [1947], 155, n) read and commented on what he described as Klein’s
“excellent” thesis in manuscript form. In his discussion of the General Theory, Klein
(1950b, ix, 97, 8, 16) emphasised that “the interest theory of this system is the
solution to the entire set of equations which is based on the liquidity-preference
building block [emphasis in original]”. But Klein also emphasised that “the major
theoretical innovation of the Treatise was an analysis of the functions of money and
the motives which lead people to hold cash balances … the foundations of Keynes’
later liquidity preference theory of interest”.
Klein’s (1950b, 96, 101) thesis also reflected some of the polemics of the emerging
modern configuration. Referring to the reviewers of the General Theory Klein
described Knight as one of “the mob in the stoning of the revolutionary dissenter” and
Viner as someone who “did not agree with the theory of liquidity preference … He
was not able to give up the quantity equation”.
In “1923, as a faithful pupil of the classical school”, Keynes (1936, 334-5) argued that
“the claim to cure Unemployment involves the Protectionist fallacy in its grossest and
crudest form”. But in the General Theory, Keynes (1936, 339, 341-4, 351) sought to
unravel and undermine the “domination of the classical school” and to locate
antecedents to his emphasis on money demand. With fixed exchange rates, the
interest rate could not be used to facilitate “full employment” and had been sacrificed
“to the operation of blind forces”. In contrast, mercantilists opposed high interest
rates: “they were even aware that the rate of interest depended on liquidity-preference
and the quantity of money”. Between these two positions stood economists with
varying degrees of confusion. David Hume had “a foot and a half in the classical
world”, while the “great” John Locke had managed to have “one foot in the
mercantilist world and … one foot in the classical world”. One of the defining
characteristics of those who had (partially) escaped the “classical” nonsense was an
understanding of liquidity preference. Not only had Locke failed to proceed to “a
genuine synthesis” but he was also “confused” and “overlooked altogether the
possibility of fluctuations in liquidity preference” [emphasis in original]. As usual
Keynes added some provocative spice to his analysis: “One recurs to the analogy
between the sway of the classical school of economic theory and that of certain
religions”.
In the General Theory, Keynes (1936, 174, 194-5) explained that “the concept of
Hoarding may be regarded as a first approximation to the concept of Liquiditypreference”. Liquidity preference was “substantially the same as that which has been
sometimes discussed under the heading of the Demand for Money … In my Treatise
on Money I studied the total demand for money under the headings of incomedeposits, business-deposits, and savings-deposits, and I need not repeat here the
analysis which I gave in Chapter 3 of that book”. Keynes (1936, 176, n3, 179)
specifically associated Knight with a theory of interest which was “precisely in the
traditional, classical mould”. In Keynes’ judgement, Knight and the other “classical”
theorists were guilty of propagating a “nonsense” and had failed to “furnish material
for a theory of interest”. When “we introduce the state of liquidity-preference and the
quantity of money … then the whole position becomes determinate”.

10

Knight scribbled “Nonsense” and sometimes even stronger comments throughout his
copy of the General Theory (Patinkin 1981, 289). In his milder published review,
Knight (chapter 50 [1937], 122, n22) objected to the tone of the General Theory: “it
has become quite the fashion to account for differences in intellectual positions by
psycho-analysing, or somehow ‘explaining’ one’s opponent (and the example of
following the fashion having in this case been set by Mr Keynes)”.xix In 1940, Knight
opposed the award of an honorary degree to Keynes on the grounds that “His work
and influence seem to me supremely ‘anti-intellectual’” in that he had sought to
pander to the “prejudices” of “the man-in-the-street” (cited by Patinkin 1981, 301).
As Harrod (1951, 409) pointed out, “the greater part of the doctrine of the General
Theory on liquidity preference is to be found quite clearly set out in the Treatise”. In
the Treatise Keynes (1930, 249) discussed the motives for “the main variation in the
total demand for money”. In the Econometrica article which launched the IS-LM
formalisation of the General Theory, Hicks (1937, 147) declared that that it was “the
liquidity preference doctrine which is vital” in distinguishing the “classical” from the
Keynesian equations: “Liquidity Preference transports us from the ‘Treasury View’ to
the ‘General Theory of Employment’”. Both Knight and Viner took exception to
Keynes’ analysis of money demand: “His use of the term ‘liquidity’ to designate
everything that makes it desirable to hold money … does not seem to be an advance
or justifiable”. Keynes’ assertion “that the rate of interest does, at any time,
equilibrate the desirability of holding cash with the quantity of cash, is not only badly
worded … but is definitely besides the point” (Knight chapter 50 [1937], 112). Viner
(chapter 48 [1936], 158-9; [1964], 258-263) complained about Keynes’ “gross
oversimplification” of the issue. However, the focus of Chicagoan opposition
remained the General Theory not the Treatise.
In ‘Some Notes on Liquidity Preference’, Kahn (1954, 250, 245) explained that
Keynes never really escaped from the idea of a “stable” money demand relationship.
Kahn sought to undermine Dennis Robertson’s attempt to put liquidity preference
theory on stronger grounds by replacing the speculative motive for holding money.
He was responding to Robertson’s (1946, 25) assertion that “the older Cambridge
theory is kinder to ‘liquidity preference’ than is Mr Keynes” of the General Theory.
Kahn concluded that “Sufficient has been said to demonstrate the unsuitability of
thinking of a schedule of liquidity preference as though it could be represented by a
well-defined curve or by a functional relationship expressed in mathematical terms or
subject to econometric processes. Keynes himself often gave way to the temptation to
picture the state of liquidity preference as a fairly stable relationship, despite his
intuitional horror of undue formalism, but his treatment at least can be justified by the
need at the time for a forceful and clear-cut exposition if it was to carry any weight at
all”.
Kahn (1984, 171, 53, 51, 59, 137) heard Keynes lecturing from early drafts of
Treatise and “found his lectures extremely puzzling, based, as they were, on the
Quantity Theory. (The great change occurred in the Summer Term of 1932)”. Kahn
complained that the Tract was “far more strictly monetarist than Marshall and Pigou”.
But Keynes then “spent a considerable part of the next twelve years of his life in a
struggle to escape from the stranglehold of the Quantity Theory”. When the General
Theory was published, “that was the end of the Quantity Theory until its recent
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resuscitation. Keynes in his long fight for release had conquered”. In this battle for
mental liberation the Treatise represented “an intermediate phase”. Kahn reflected
that “the origins of the liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest go back to
Marshall … In a primitive, but extremely interesting form, the theory is to be found in
a section of the Treatise”.xx
Patinkin (chapter 45 [1975], 260; 1976, 7, 136, 45, 81) also described the Tract, the
Treatise and the General Theory as Keynes’ interwar “trilogy … The Saga of Man’s
Struggle for Freedom from the Quantity Theory”. Keynes had inherited this quantitytheory tradition “from his teachers at Cambridge”. Patinkin cited the preface to the
French edition of the General Theory in which Keynes stated that “the following
analysis [of money and prices] registers my final escape from the confusions of the
Quantity Theory, which once entangled me”. Patinkin provided what he regarded as
“conclusive evidence that a significant shift took place in Keynes’ views on the
efficacy of monetary policy between the Treatise and the General Theory”. In the
Treatise there was “the unmistakable ring of the quantity theory” plus “the essence of
the theory of liquidity preference”.
In autumn 1932, Keynes delivered lectures at Cambridge on ‘The Monetary Theory of
Production’ (Patinkin 1976, 72).xxi In those lectures, Keynes (JMK XIII [1932], 3978) referred to “the state of liquidity-preference … which tells us what … the rate of
interest exclusive of risk-allowance, will be, given to [the ?] quantity of money”.
Keynes also discussed a fall in output “in accordance with the argument in my
Treatise on Money. Consequently the demand for money in the active circulation will
fall, which in turn will affect the state of liquidity preference so that there will be a
lowering cet. par. of the rate of interest corresponding to the given quantity of
money” (Keynes cited by Patinkin 1980, 18). Patinkin (1976, 72) commented that
“The voice is that of the General Theory: but the analytical framework is still largely
that of the Treatise”.
Patinkin (1976, 33) explained that “One of the standard tasks with which every
student of Keynes’ writings is confronted if that of tracing the intellectual relationship
between the General Theory and the Treatise”. Patinkin also noted that “economists
who did their graduate training after the appearance of the General Theory – that is,
the vast majority of professional economists today – are unlikely ever to have studied
the Treatise systematically”. As an historian, Patinkin qualified for this minority
status. As someone who did his graduate training between the Treatise and the
General Theory, so too did Friedman.
4. 1931: Keynes and the Chicago School
Keynes spent a fortnight in Chicago (22 June-2 July 1931) attending the Harris
Foundation lectures and seminars on “Unemployment as a World Problem” against
the background of two parallel banking crises, in both Europe and in Chicago. The
1931 European financial crisis had started with the failure of the Credit Anstalt bank
in Vienna on 11 May. This financial contagion began to spread to Austria’s
neighbours, including Germany. From late May, the Reichbank began to suffer heavy
losses of reserves. On 20 June 1931, President Hoover proposed a two-year
moratorium on war debts and reparation payments. On 24 June 1931, the Reichbank
obtained a central-bank credit of $100 million which temporarily calmed the markets.
This “unexpected” development forced Karl Pribram (1931, 112, 118) from the
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University of Frankfurt, to rewrite part of his Harris Foundation lecture. With respect
to unemployment, “the situation has nowhere reached such a critical state as in
Germany. And this reflection brings us back to the hopes of recovery attached to the
execution of Mr Hoover’s relief action”.xxii
Between December 1929 and the end of 1932, two thirds of banks in Chicago failed, a
higher proportion than any other major US city (Phillips 1994, 17). When Roosevelt
received the Democratic nomination in Chicago in June 1932, the city was in the
midst of a banking crisis: “great crowds gathered at the banks” (Hoover 1952, 170;
Kennedy 1973, 40-42). Keynes (JMK XX, 555-7, 571) was shocked by the banking
crisis that he found upon his arrival in Chicago. On the same day that he gave his first
Harris Foundation lecture he wrote to Hubert Henderson: “Quite apart from the
immediate situations, German or other, the effect on the situation here which I had
most underestimated before I came was the position of many banks in the country …
Owing to the number of banks which have actually failed there is great unrest among
depositors. There is a possibility at any moment of bank runs breaking out in
different parts of the country, similar to what was lately experienced at Chicago. The
consequence is that depositors not infrequently take their money out in cash and keep
it in a safe deposit box. This has been particularly marked in recent weeks in the
Chicago district, where safe deposit boxes are no longer obtainable. Everyone agrees
that there must be at least $400,000,00 to $500,000,000 being actually hoarded by the
public in the shape of currency in boxes. The same movement which has been
occurring in Chicago might break out at any time in the Middle West if suspicions as
to the position of the banks were to increase”. On his return to Britain, Keynes
reflected that “The Chicago situation is largely a reflection of a quite appalling real
estate collapse from which it may take years to recover”.
Keynes (1931a, 3, 4, 27, 35, 40, 16-7) began his Harris lecture in apocalyptic fashion:
“We are today in the middle of the greatest economic catastrophe – the greatest
catastrophe due almost entirely to economic causes – of the modern world. I am told
the view held in Moscow that this is the last, the culminating crisis of capitalism and
that our existing order of society will not survive it”. Keynes dissented from this
pessimism: “I believe that our destiny is in our own hands and that we can emerge
from it if only we choose - or rather if those choose who are in authority in the
world”. He explained that a “secure basis for a return to an equilibrium of prosperity”
could only be achieved by increasing the volume of investment and allowing a revival
of the price level. He suggested that interest rates needed to be reduced via an
increase in “the quantity of liquid assets” through open market operations which
“involves technical questions of some difficulty with which I must not burden this
lecture”.
The United States (and presumably Chicago) in 1931 had a profound impact on
Keynes (JMK XX [1931], 586): “Before I went to the United States I was disposed to
hold with some confidence that the first impetus to recovery in the rest of the world
would have to come from America. I held this view so firmly that it was sometime
before I even questioned it. But eventually it was put to me point blank in discussion
that perhaps the opposite was true. And in the end I came to wonder whether this
might not be the more probable opinion. We may have to drag along what seems an
endless period until something happens to stir the dry bones elsewhere then in North
America”.xxiii
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Keynes’ Harris lecture certainly made an impression on J. Laurence Laughlin, the
founding chairman of the Chicago economics department and the founding editor of
the JPE (1892-5). In The Federal Reserve Act its Origin and Problems, Laughlin
(1933, 222, 229, 231-2) abused the quantity theory, Fisher and his “unquestionable
error … the American inflationist school of Irving Fisher has called in for
reinforcement … John Maynard Keynes”. Keynes’ “remarks on the abandonment of
the British gold standard and the sacerdotal nature assigned to the influence of the
quantity of money on prices are scarcely credible”. Presumably referring to the Harris
lectures, Laughlin continued: “Coming to this country [Keynes] was, of course, given
a hearing in magazines and as a speaker, but his method of going off into difficult
ground, where it was hard for the untrained mass to follow kept him from making
much of an impression. On the gold standard and its substitution by sterling, he could
not easily be followed … Such exposition sounds most like the theorising taken from
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. It would seem as if Keynes in this process has
stepped off the firmer earth into the violent instability of dreams. It is too fantastic to
be taken seriously”.
But Patinkin (chapter 46 [1981/1979], 293-4) asserted that the Harris lectures
“apparently did not bring [Keynes] into contact with the Chicago School … Henry
Simons (who was then an assistant professor) did participate in several of the round
tables, but he too did so actively only once and inconsequentially (Reports, p. 88).
Only Lloyd Mints (then also an assistant professor) played a more active role”. Given
the pivotal importance of Mints’ Economics 330 in the dispute over Chicago oral
tradition this seems a surprising assertion. Virtually all of the Chicago economists
were listed as members of the 1931 roundtable group, including Garfield Cox, Aaron
Director, Harry Gideonse, Frank Knight, Harry Millis, Samuel Nerlove, Henry
Schultz, Chester Wright, Quincy Wright and Theodore Yntema (Davis 1971,
appendix B). The evidence suggests that the Harris lectures unambiguously brought
the Chicago School into contact with Keynes, oral traditions and the quantity theorymoney demand nexus.
Simons contributed to the session led by Hansen (24th June) on ‘Business Cycles,
Price Levels and Unemployment’. Hansen (1931, 59-60) argued that “one of the
things that tends to prolong the depression at the present time as against earlier
periods is the fact that takes a longer time to reach a readjustment in the internal price
structure, because our price and wage systems are becoming increasingly rigid. That
means there is a longer lag, a longer time before you reach a new equilibrium in the
internal price structure, which I think is a fundamental condition for an increase in the
rate of investment”. Hansen (1931, 62) dissented from the analysis provided by the
Treatise: “It seems to me that the maladjustment between the rate investment and the
rate of savings, which Mr Keynes discusses so clearly in his book, is fundamentally to
be found not on the saving side, but on the investment side”. The proposal to increase
wages, Hansen (1931, 64-5) argued “invert[ed] cause and effect … this thesis entirely
overlooks all the fundamental principles which I am not willing to abandon, that we
have had worked out through a long development of economic theory of the relation
of money and prices, a theory, in other words, of the value of money. You cannot
control the price level by raising the price of one agent of production. That, in a
nutshell, is the point”.
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Keynes (1931a, 73-4) responded: “I find it very difficult to discuss this question
without making a distinction between the level of prices and the level of costs … The
quantity theory, I think, is essentially an equilibrium theory. When the two are in
adjustment, when costs and prices are adapted to one another, the level of the two of
them depends on the quantity of money”.
Keynes (JMK XX [1931], 580) later reflected that at the Chicago conference the
majority opinion favoured the view that the wage-price nexus operated in reverse: “I
heard the question of the advisability of wage reductions discussed in a large
gathering of academic economists. The voice of the ‘equilibriumists’ … was heard,
but I think it would be true to say that the balance of opinion was decidedly in favour
of the view that the immediate advantages to employment from wage reductions
would not be large and were outweighed by other considerations (social and the effect
on the price level in relation to monetary indebtedness)”.
Lewis Lorwin (1931, 84) asked Keynes about his preference for an “indirect” solution
to unemployment by manipulating the interest rate as opposed to more “direct”
methods. Keynes (1931a, 84) replied: “I use that because I am speaking in the
country which is the last home of individualism”. Wright, Director, Cox, Simons and
Mints all took part in the subsequent discussion. Keynes (1931a, 92) thought that this
discussion “brings us back to the question asked about individualism, whether private
capitalism is capable of solving the problem completely. I do not feel at all certain.”
Referring to the idea that “the conditions which lead to prosperity have within them
the seeds of depression … so long as you have as a guiding force the desire for
profit”, Wright (1931b, 93) asked Keynes “whether at least that degree of inevitability
is inherent?” Keynes (1931a, 93) responded: “I should agree that the capitalistic
society as we now run it is essentially unstable. The question in my mind is whether
one could preserve the stability by the injection of a moderate degree of management;
whether in practice it is beyond our power to do this, and that we will have to have
some further plan of control. I should like to try the central bank method first,
uncertain how far in practice it would lead us. If that proved to be incapable of
keeping things reasonably steady, but I should go in for a very great degree of state
control of the rate of investment”.
As a result of this questioning, Keynes (1931a, 94) outlined two aspects of the
philosophy to which Simons and the “rules party” objected. Keynes advocated
discretionary macroeconomic management to “keep the price index and the
employment index steady”. Hansen (1931, 94) asked whether it was not the case that
“in our present state of knowledge we have no guide at all dependable, and
consequently the system you propose is a purely Utopia one?”
Keynes (1931a, 94) defended himself by explaining that “statistics are becoming more
adequate … I think we economists have given the practical business men very little
real help in the past. If they were aided by more complete statistical data, then I think
we should find central banks doing their best duty”. When asked by Hansen (1931,
94) about the reliability of the “judgment” of the central bankers, Keynes (1931a, 94)
replied: “I think we already know enough to give them general suggestions … Painful
experience works wonders. It is really the economists who are primarily at fault. We
have never given any sort of scientific conclusions, such as you would expect. So
long as the supposedly experts fail to agree among themselves, it seems to me
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reasonable for the practical business men to pay only moderate attention to them”.
Magnusson (1931, 96) asked him: “Must we not be very careful in our use of the
word ‘scientists’? Are we justified in really flirting with the word?” In reply, Keynes
(1931a, 96) explained that “Ours is a very complex science. It possesses the subject
matter of science”.
5. 1931: Keynes and Mints
In the June 23rd seminar on ‘Public Works Construction and Unemployment’, Keynes
(1931a, 303) stated that he thought “the argument for public works in this country is
much weaker than it is in Great Britain. In Great Britain I have for a long time past
agitated very strongly for a public works program, and my argument has been that we
are such a centre of an international system that we cannot operate on the rate of
interest … In this country you haven’t a problem of that kind. Here you can function
as though you were a closed system … For such a system I would use as my first
method operating on the long term rate of interest … I think in this country deliberate
public works should be regarded much more as a tonic to change the state of business
conditions, but the means of getting back to the state of equilibrium should be
concentrated on the rate of interest”.
Mints had an extensive exchange with Keynes during the Harris Foundation seminars.
Keynes led the discussion on ‘Is it possible for Governments and Central Banks to do
Anything on Purpose to Remedy Unemployment?’ Chairman Quincy Wright (1931b,
461) invited the audience “to take up the cudgels with Mr Keynes”. Mints (1931,
479) asked Keynes: “Your means of reducing a long-term rate of interest has been an
indirect means. I wonder what you would say to a more direct means, namely
purchasing industrial and public utility bonds by the member banks themselves”.
Mints did not receive a satisfactory reply. Later, Keynes (1931a, 493) stated that “the
forces of supply are the savings of the community: the forces of demand are the
amount of construction that will take place at different rates of interest, and I want to
fix the rate of interest at the point where the supply and demand meet”. Mints (1931,
493-4) pressed Keynes again: “I should like to revert for a moment to the question of
the relative importance of lowering the interest rate and public works. As I
understand your argument, you want to reduce the interest rate in order to bring about
equivalence between saving and investment. As a matter of fact, won’t public works
bring about precisely the same results, not through decreasing the rate of interest, but
increasing the rate of return for business firms, thereby increasing the rate of
investment, even at current rates of interest?”
Keynes (1931a, 494) replied: “Certainly; therefore I am in favour of an admixture of
public works, but my feeling is that unless you socialise the country to a degree that is
unlikely, you will get to the end of the public works programme, if not in one year, in
two years, and therefore if you’re not prepared to reduce the rate of interest and bring
back private enterprise, when you get to the end of the public works programme you
have shot your bolt, and you are no better off. I should use the public works
programme to fill in the interregnum while I was getting the interest down. The
public works program would in itself increase business profits, and therefore relieve
people from that exceptional unwillingness to borrow. I should be afraid of that as a
sole remedy. I should be afraid it would work itself out, come to an end, and then we
should be back where we were unless we decided on a very definite further action”.
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According to Kahn (1974, 368-9), Keynes had previously been “curiously
conventional for a genius”. Influenced by Kahn’s (1931, 1933) multiplier articles,
Keynes gradually began to embrace a position much closer to that espoused in 1931
by Mints. By 1951, it appears that Mints’ pre-General Theory advocacy of public
works had undergone a transformation. Dennis Robertson (1951, 466-7), in a review
of Mints’ (1950) Monetary Policy for a Competitive Society suggested that Mints’
opposition to public works looked as if it was “tinged with fanaticism”.
Samuelson (1996, 149-150, 154-5) may have witnessed part of this transformation
during his undergraduate years at Chicago (1932-5). He was taught undergraduate
monetary economics by Mints using Robertson’s Money and another text from which
he “was taught MV=PQ”. When, in 1935, he was considering whether to go to
Harvard graduate school he was “warned by Lloyd Mints that Seymour Harris in
macroeconomics was an inflationist … Mints must have had some keen sense of
smell, because after Harris did get tenure he became a flaming Keynesian”.xxiv
But in Chicago, Keynes (1931a, 27, 35, 40, 16-7) explained that a “secure basis for a
return to an equilibrium of prosperity” could only be achieved by increasing volume
of investment and allowing a revival of the price level. Keynes suggested that interest
rates needed to be reduced via an increase in “the quantity of liquid assets” through
open market operations which “involves technical questions of some difficulty with
which I must not burden this lecture”. Keynes explained that he was limited by “the
medium of oral exposition” adding that “Those who may wish to pursue the matter
further I must refer to my Treatise on Money”. There is common agreement that in
June 1931, Keynes essentially repeated the analysis contained in the Treatise
(Patinkin 1976, 68; Moggridge 1992, 518; Skidelsky 1992, 391; Dimand 1988, 143-4;
Klein 1950b, 35).
Lorie Tarshis (1996, 55) recalled that on 10th October 1932, Keynes arrived for the
first lecture of a course that had been scheduled as ‘The Theory of Money and Prices’;
but announced that the lecture series had a new title: ‘The Monetary Theory of
Production’, a change that Keynes declared was “significant”. Tarshis reflected that
this was “the opening bugle of the Keynesian revolution”. In October 1932, before
the modern configuration had fully emerged, Friedman scribbled on his 330
bibliography: “Look up Keynes’ lectures for Harris Foundation on reserve at E11
under Q. Wright’s name”. Friedman, like other attentive 330 graduate students,
presumably wrote these words in at Mints’ suggestion.
6. 1932-3: Mints and Friedman
6.1 Economics 330 Course Outline
There are in effect two relevant Economics 330 bibliographies in the Friedman
archives.xxv The first is the version that Mints presumably circulated in the first class
of the course and the second is the version that Mints actually used for the course
(which consists of the first plus Friedman’s handwritten additions).
The only two items in the first bibliography that are added to in the second relate to
Irving Fisher’s Purchasing Power of Money and Keynes’ Treatise. With respect to
the first, Friedman (to Patinkin 19 July 1972) recalled “that Mints paid a great deal of
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attention to Irving Fisher’s work and in particular to the book on the Purchasing
Power of Money in the monetary course that I remember taking from him. Certainly I
recall when I left Chicago after being a graduate student there in the period from 1932
to 1935, I left with a definite opinion that Fisher was one of the great men of the time
and one of the great contributors to monetary analysis. Perhaps I got that somewhere
else, but I think I got it in large measure from Mints’ course”.xxvi Since Mints
informed Patinkin (1981, 285) that “I have always had the greatest respect for Irving
Fisher” Friedman’s recollection appears to be justified.
Amongst the 19 items on the second section of the first bibliography were “Fisher,
Purchasing Power of Money, chs. 2-5” which Friedman corrected by hand to read “25 + 8”. Chapters 2-5 largely outlined the equation of exchange. The purpose of
chapter 8 (“Influence of quantity of money and other factors on purchasing power and
on each other”) was “to set forth the causes determining the purchasing power of
money … It is proposed in this chapter to inquire how far these propositions are really
causal propositions” [Fisher’s emphasis]. The chapter concluded that “we find
nothing to interfere with the truth of the quantity theory that variations in money (M)
produce normally proportional changes in prices” (Fisher 1922 [1911], 149, 151,
183).xxvii
Patinkin (chapter 5 [1969/1981], 245, 250) concluded that the Chicago quantity
theory was “first and foremost, not a theory of the demand for money, but a theory
which relates the quantity of money (M) to the aggregate demand for goods and
services (MV), and thence to the price level (P) and/or level of output (T); all this in
accordance with Fisher’s MV=PT”. According to Patinkin’s notes from Mints’ 1944
lectures: “Mints prefers following statement of quantity theory: P is the dependent
variable (in the long-run) of the equation MV=PT. But in the short run all variables
tend to move together”.
At one level, the structure of the 1932 version of 330 appears to support Patinkin’s
account. According to the course outline there were three sections. The first section
was devoted to “The functions of money and banking (a) the origins of money; (b) the
functions of money (c) the functions of banking”; the second to “Statement of theories
concerning the relation of money and banking to the price level”; and the third to
“Appraisal of these theories by means of (a) logical analysis; (b) examination of the
process of changes in the price level”.
At a deeper level, the evidence supports Friedman’s memory. In the first
bibliography there are two entries for “Keynes, Monetary Reform”: the first under
section II, “Statement of theories concerning the relation of money and banking to the
price level” (“pages 81-95”) and the second under “Some general references on the
theory of international prices” (“pp. 95-116”). Both entries come from chapter 3
(‘The theory of money and of the foreign exchanges’).
Keynes had been teaching the material contained in chapter 3 of the Tract on
Monetary Reform at Cambridge since 1911 (Skidelsky 1992, 153; 1983, 214-21;
Moggridge 1992, 197-200). In that year, Keynes (JMK 1983, 11 [1911], 375-76) in his
review of Fisher’s Purchasing Power of Money stated that “the theory of money, as it
has ordinarily been understood and taught by academic economists in England for some
time past, is considerably in advance of any published account of it. It is hardly an

18
exaggeration to say that monetary theory, in its most accurate form, has become in
England a matter of oral tradition. These preliminary remarks are necessary in order to
explain that it is from the standpoint of this oral tradition, rather than from that of any
printed book, that an English economist must approach Professor Fisher’s very
important contribution to the subject”.
Chapter 3 of Monetary Reform began with the statement that “The quantity theory of
money … is fundamental. Its correspondence with fact is not open to question”.
Keynes (1923, 74, 84-6, 95-116) explained that the supply of money was “under the
direct control (or ought to be) of the central banking authorities” but that the public’s
holding of cash and deposits was “not directly controllable, and depends on the mood
of the public and the business world”. Keynes then argued that “Cyclical
fluctuations” were characterised primarily by changes in the latter and not the former.
Stabilising the price level, Keynes argued, required the authorities to vary the money
supply so as to “counterbalance” the movements of money demand.
6.2 Friedman’s Readings, 330 Lecture Notes and Examination Paper
At the end of the course, Mints required his students to answer four examination
questions from a total of five. The first two were invitations to critically examine
statements made by Frederick Hayek and Ralph Hawtrey (the second relating to
Fisher’s equation of exchange). The third was an invitation to examine the ceteris
paribus assumption of the quantity theory. Question 4a was: “Discuss the relation
between the k of Keynes’ earlier equation and the velocity of circulation”. 4b was
“Discuss the statement that changes in the velocity of circulation of goods cannot
bring about changes in the price level because of the fact that they necessarily bring
about compensating changes in the velocity of circulation of money”. Question 5 was
“According to Keynes’ analysis what would it be necessary to do in order to eliminate
the business cycle? State and support your opinion of Keynes’ conclusion”.
Milton and Rose Friedman both took this examination, which was scheduled
immediately following Viner’s examination. Rose Friedman recalled that Viner was
“an extreme disciplinarian in the classroom. Some students found the course
forbidding and lived in fear of the man and of his subject. I found the course
stimulating but the man forbidding, in part because the tales I had heard as an
undergraduate about how tough he was. The gossip was that he failed at least a third
of the class every year”. Because her brother, Aaron Director, was on the faculty she
“was nervous about embarrassing him by not making the grade … I was so nervous at
the end of Viner’s exam that I could not read the questions in Mints’s exam”. When
Mints saw her paralysed in his examination room “he came over and asked what was
wrong. I explained my problem. In a very fatherly way, he said, ‘Just relax for a few
minutes and you’ll be fine’. But that didn’t happen. When Mints came around a
second time when I was in no better mental condition, his answer was, ‘You can write
a paper on Keynes’s Treatise on Money instead’” (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 35,
38). This could only be interpreted as an act of kindness if the Treatise was such a
prominent component of the course as to be easily accessible even to a student
suffering from Viner-paralysis.
Not only were the last required words of the course about Keynes, but also the first
words that Friedman wrote in his notes were “Econ 330 Keynes”. Mints concluded
that: “General Framework of Keynes likely to endure much longer than details. 1.
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Equality of Investment + Savings. Is this idea something entirely new? Mints says
no”. The evidence suggests that in autumn 1932 Mints allocated more attention to the
Treatise than he had intended to. The Treatise appeared as item 18 in the original
bibliography under section II with the required readings listed as “Vol I, chs. 9-12 and
14”. Friedman underlined the whole of item 18 and crossed out the original chapters
and replaced the entry with “chs. 9-19”. Under section IIIa. Friedman added “Keynes
Treatise vol I Pages 53-120 (part. 53-88), also 221-239”. Friedman initially took
thirty pages of notes from chapters 9-19 of the Treatise, and then took an additional
fifty-one pages of detailed notes from volume one and six pages of notes from volume
two.
Chapter 19 of the Treatise began with the observation that “The experience of
postwar period led many of us to advocate stability of the price level as the best
possible objective of practical policy. Amongst other things, this would mean an
attempt on the part of the banking authorities to eliminate the credit cycle at all costs”.
Chapter 10 (‘The Fundamental Equations for the Value of Money’) began with the
observation that “The Fundamental Problem of Monetary Theory is … to treat the
problem dynamically, analysing the different elements involved, in such a manner as
to exhibit the causal process by which the price level is determined, and a method of
transition from one period of equilibrium to another. The forms of the Quantity
Theory, however, on which we have all been brought up – I shall give an account of
them in detail in Chapter 14 – are but ill adapted for this purpose” (Keynes 1930, 293,
133).
Chapter 14 was devoted to ‘Alternative Forms of the Fundamental Equation’. Section
1, outlining ‘The “Real Balances” Quantity Equation’, almost perfectly capture
Friedman’s (chapter 2 [1956], 3-4) description of the Chicago oral tradition in which
it was vitally important to explain “why people are willing to hold the particular
nominal quantity of money in existence … The quantity theory is in the first instance
a theory of the demand for money”. In section 2 of chapter 14 (‘The “Cambridge”
Quantity Equation’), Keynes (1930, 229) explained that he was doing little more than
capturing a Cambridge oral tradition: “The ‘Real-balances’ Equation discussed above
is descended from a method of approach long familiar to those who have heard
Professors Marshall and Pigou in the lecture-rooms of Cambridge”.xxviii It appears
that chapter 14 made a special impression on Friedman. Under his notes entitled “1.
‘Real-Balances’ Quantity Equation” Friedman provided what appears to be the only
cross-reference in these fifty-seven pages: “[see notes on Monetary Reform]”.
Keynes (1924, 336) explained that Alfred Marshall’s “main ideas became known to
pupils in a general way, with the result that there grew up at Cambridge an oral
tradition, first from Marshall’s own lectures and since his retirement from those of
Professor Pigou, different from, and (I think it may be claimed) superior to, anything
that could be found in printed books until recently”. Keynes then added a footnote:
“Professor Irving Fisher being the first, in several instances, to publish in book-form
ideas analogous to those which had been worked out by Marshall at much earlier
dates”.
Keynes (1924, 338) summarised the Marshallian approach to money as reflected in
Money Credit and Commerce: “Marshall also expounded long ago the way in which
distrust of a currency raises prices by diminishing the willingness of the public to hold
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stocks of it – a phenomenon to which recent events have now called everyone’s
attention; and he was aware that the fluctuation in the price level, which is an
accompaniment of the trade cycle, corresponds to a fluctuation in the volume of
‘ready command’ which the public desire to hold”. After ‘ready command’ Keynes
added a footnote: “This is Marshall’s phrase for what I have called ‘real balances’”.
In 1932, Mints required his 330 students to read Marshall’s Money Credit and
Commerce and Friedman took two pages of notes from chapter IV, ‘Total Value of
the Currency Needed by a Country’. Friedman wrote: “Function of Currency. A.
Money demand not for own sake but its possession gives ready command of general
purchasing power in a convenient form … Total value of a country’s currency,
multiplied into the average no. of times of its changing hands for business purposes
each year, is of course = to the total amount of business transacted in that country by
direct payment of currency in that year. But this identity statement does not indicate
the causes that govern the rapidity of circulation of currency: to discover that we must
look to amount of purchasing power which the people of that country elect to keep in
form of currency”.
In his 330 bibliography, Friedman wrote “read” underlined four times alongside
“Hansen Business Cycle Theory, chs. 1 and 6” and took thirty pages of notes from
that book. Hansen (1927, iv, 3, 7) explained that his purpose was to enable the
student “to cut a path through the tangled mass of apparently contradictory
explanations of the business cycle”. In Chapter 1 (‘A Classification of Business
Cycle Theories’) Hansen identified “three broad type of business cycle theories”. The
first two types believed that the business cycle was a “function of the capitalist
economy”; the first seeking remedies through redistributing income in a more
egalitarian fashion; the second focusing attention on the inherent nature of
technology. The third type of explanation saw the business cycle as “a function of the
money economy”.
In Chapter 6 (‘The Money Economy as a Cause of the Business Cycle’), Hansen
(1927, 139, 143-4) explained that Hawtrey’s “theory of the business cycle may be
said to be the culmination of the line of analysis which we have been tracing”. The
central element of this type of theory was that “It is the flow [Hansen’s emphasis] of
purchasing power that is important, not the outstanding aggregate of money units.
The ‘unspent margin’ in terms of money units, is made up of the money in circulation
and the bank credit outstanding … Hawtrey’s ‘command over wealth which the
people hold in reserve’ appears to be similar to J. M. Keynes’s ‘volume of real
balances … [which] may fluctuate violently even though there is little change in the
volume of cash or in the reserve policy of the banks”. Hansen (1927, 144) proposed
that this Hawtrey-Keynes type of theory be called “deflations and inflations of real
balances”.
In 1932, Mints also prescribed “Pigou, The Value of Money, in the Quarterly Journal
of Economics for 1917-18, pp. 38-65”. Two decades later Mints coedited an AEA
volume of Readings in Monetary Theory in which Pigou’s essay was reprinted (Lutz
and Mints 1952). In the 1950s Friedman presumably had an opportunity to reread
Pigou’s article since he recommended the Lutz-Mints volume to his students
(Hammond 1999). Pigou (1952 [1917-8], 163, 183, 173-4) explained that he was “not
in any sense an ‘opponent’ of the quantity theory or a hostile critic of Professor
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Fisher’s lucid analysis”. But to “tackle” the problems associated with the value of
money “without tools is like going into a modern battle unhelmeted and unarmed.
The ‘quantity theory’ furnishes a tool which in the skilled hands of Professor Irving
Fisher has accomplished great things. But less experienced craftsmen need, I think, a
better – a more completely fool-proof tool. It is this that, in the preceding pages, I
have endeavoured to provide”.
The bulk of Pigou’s article was devoted to the demand for money, its supply and the
interaction between the two. Having derived “the demand schedule for money … the
dry bones of my equation of demand” Pigou explained that “it remains to explain the
relation in which that equation stands to the ‘equation of exchange’ made familiar in
the ‘quantity theory’ – an equation, by the way, which would itself be more properly
described as an equation of demand”. Pigou claimed that the money demand
formulation of the quantity theory was “a somewhat more effective engine of analysis
… I offer this specification of it in order that those interested in monetary theory may
test its powers in actual work upon concrete problems”.
In 1932, Mints also prescribed “Robertson, Money, revised edition, chs. 2, 3 and 4”.
Two thirds of a century later it remained, in Friedman’s judgement, “one of the most
lucid and profound presentations of the central principles of monetary theory”
(Friedman and Friedman 1998, 247). In contrast, Samuelson (1996, 148-9) used
Robertson’s Money to support Patinkin’s assault on Friedman.xxix However, in
chapter 2 on “The Value of Money” Robertson (1928, 39, 30, 37) explained that he
was describing “the underlying psychological forces determining the value of money
… given the conditions of demand for money, its value depends on the quantity of it
available”. The “truth” of the matter was that “in estimating the demand for money
we must take into account not only the volume of goods to be disposed of within a
given time, but also the frequency with which each of them changes hands … the
magnitude of the demand for money, like that of the demand for bread, turns out to be
the result of a process of individual weighing-up of competing advantages at the
margin” [Robertson’s emphases].xxx
Patinkin’s (chapter 5 [1969/1981], 255) “main point” was that Friedman (chapter 2
[1956]) presented “an elegant and sophisticated statement of modern Keynesian theory
… whose analytical structure as it now exists stems from the publication during the
1930s of Keynes’ Treatise on Money (vol 1, pp140-46)” plus Hicks (1935, 13-32) and
Keynes (1936, 166-72, 22-9). But years before the General Theory, Keynes (1924,
337) stressed that this marginal portfolio analysis of an individual’s demand for
money was part of the Marshallian heritage. Hicks (1935, 3) also emphasised that in
the Treatise, Keynes had “put substance” into the analysis of “choice at the margin …
by his doctrine that the relative preference depends upon the ‘bearishness’ or
‘bullishness’ of the public, upon their relative desire for liquidity or profit”. This was
“the most important part of his theoretical contribution”.
Thus Patinkin (chapter 5 1969/1981], 242, 255) argued that Friedman’s (chapter 2
[1956]) supposed “reformulation” of the quantity theory was “a misleading
designation” because “what Friedman has actually presented is an elegant exposition
of the modern portfolio approach to the demand for money which, though it has some
well-known (albeit largely undeveloped) antecedents in the traditional theory, can
only be seen as a continuation of the Keynesian theory of liquidity preference”.
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Friedman (chapter 2 [1956]) was “in direct continuation of this intellectual line of
descent”. Yet Patinkin included the Treatise in this lineage.
6.3 Reviews of the Treatise
On the back of his 330 bibliography Friedman wrote a list of reviews of the Treatise
which included the Keynes-Robertson and Keynes-Hayek exchanges, plus reviews
from Pigou, Hawtrey, Williams, Josiah Stamp and Charles Hardy. Mints recalled that
in the 1930s, he, Simons, Knight and probably Director met weekly at Hardy’s home.
Samuel Nerlove observed that Hardy exerted an “exceedingly significant” influence
on both Mints and Simons, having taught the latter (cited by Patinkin 1981, 284-5).
Homer Jones (9 October 1962) wrote to Margaret Porter that during his time at
Chicago in 1933-4 “Hardy’s book on the Federal Reserve System was regarded as the
best critique of the policies and actions of that central bank”. Hardy was also an early
critic of the New Deal, which he described as an attempt to “substitute centralised
authority of one sort or another for what is left of free competitive enterprise” (cited
by Saunders 1966, 54). These libertarian credentials were later reflected in Hardy’s
appointment as the founding treasurer of the Mont Pelerin Society (Hartwell 1995,
45). Friedman (chapter 7 [1972/1974], 164, n19) appears to be justified in describing
Hardy as a Chicagoan “at one remove”.
In the first part of his review, Hardy (1931a, 150-2) predicted that Keynes’ work
would be the most influential book published since the war and would “profoundly”
modify the “serious work of the next generation on business cycles, central banking,
and international finance”. In the second part, Hardy (1931b, 394) argued that
Keynes’ analysis should be “supplemented by Professor Fisher’s well-known theory
as to the relation between the rate of interest and the anticipated depreciation or
appreciation in the value of money … Keynes’ rejection of Fisher’s doctrine on this
point (II, 202) reflects such a complete and obvious misunderstanding of the whole
point that they can hardly be other than a lapsus calami”.
Robertson’s (1931, 409-410) review was highly critical of several aspects of the
Treatise. But he also concluded that “I have no doubt that Mr Keynes is right in
laying stress on hoarding as a dominant feature of trade depression. In this respect I
feel sure his work is of high significance … Where I suspect there is still work to be
done is in clearing up the nature of the forces which lead the spirit of hoarding down”.
Keynes (1930, 138) had previously explained that his fundamental equations
“resemble all other versions of the Quantity Theory”. In his reply to Robertson,
Keynes (1931b, 419) made it clear that he was moving still further in the direction of
focusing on the demand for money within this quantity theory framework: “I should
like to repeat that the amount of the hoards of the public is as much outside their
control as is the quantity of money, and for the same reasons … This is why it is so
important to distinguish the forces determining the quantity of hoards (which is the
affair of the banker) from the forces determining the propensity to hoard (which is the
affair of the public). The old quantity equations did not reveal this to me …”.
The first part of Hayek’s review provoked Keynes (JMK XIII [1931], 243-266) both
privately and publicly. As Patinkin (1976, 58) pointed out, “as a result of these
foregoing criticisms” Keynes was jolted further down the path towards the General
Theory. But Hayek (1932, 34-5) made clear in the second part of his review that
Keynes’ discussion of hoarding was “the most interesting aspect of his theoretical
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analysis … there is no doubt that he is here breaking new ground and that he is
opening up new vistas … the practical importance of this phenomenon is much
greater than most economists used to suppose”.
Friedman found at Chicago a “vibrant intellectual atmosphere of a kind that I had
never dreamed existed” (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 35). The excitement
associated with his monetary education must have been intensified both by spatial
proximity to the Great Depression and by temporal proximity to these debates: the
second part of Hayek’s review was published February 1932, eight months before the
start of Economics 330.xxxi
7. 1968-74: Friedman’s Defence
Patinkin and Stanley Fischer worked on ‘The Chicago Tradition, the Quantity Theory,
and Friedman’ in the year following Friedman’s AEA presidential address. Upon
receiving a draft from Patinkin, Friedman (5 December 1968) replied that: “I continue
to regard what I wrote as a reformulation of the quantity theory of money, just as I
continue to regard Keynes’ Monetary Reform, and large parts of his Treatise, and
some parts of his Gen. Theory, as the writings of a quantity theorist … I would argue
that much of K’s analysis of liquidity preference is a carry-over from his earlier
quantity theory orientation and only the absolute liquidity preference element as truly
Keynesian”.xxxii
Friedman offered the same defence at a social gathering on 16 March 1971, attended
by Homer Jones, Gary Becker, David Meiselman, Robert Gordon and Fischer. That
night Fischer wrote to Patinkin describing what had transpired: “The major points
which Milton made is that there is nothing particularly Keynesian about the liquidity
preference function, and that the demand for money sections of the General Theory
are simply a slightly inferior version of Keynes’ views in the Tract. In response to
arguments that the interest rate and rate of inflation were to be found as arguments in
the velocity function only in Lavington and Pigou (or most explicitly in those two
authors) he pulled the Tract off the shelves and with the aid of Gary Becker found
some parts under the chapter on ‘Inflation as a Tax’ which were quite suggestive.
Anyway, Milton argues that there is nothing inconsistent in having a demand-formoney function similar to that of the General Theory and being a quantity theorist,
quoting as evidence Keynes of the Tract who claimed that there was no disputing the
quantity theory”.xxxiii
Friedman (chapter 7 [1972/1974], 171) subsequently cited the chapter on ‘Inflation as
a Method of Taxation’ in his response to Patinkin. In correspondence, Friedman (5
December 1968) told Patinkin that “I find your description of the oral tradition
entirely acceptable and much better and more comprehensive than mine. In
extenuation, I can only say that the 1956 essay did not set out to be an essay in history
of thought but an introduction to a collection of studies. Unquestionably, however,
had I had your paper before me when I wrote that paper, I would have written the first
part of it differently”.xxxiv Fischer (16 March 1971) reported to Patinkin that Friedman
“said that there was only one thing to which he seriously objected – and that was the
implication that he had made up the ‘Chicago tradition (oral)’ out of whole cloth”.xxxv
Fischer continued: “When pressed on the point of the instability of velocity
emphasised in Simons and Mints, Milton agreed to Simons, but was more hesitant
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about Mints. Both Becker and Meiselman said that Mints of the early 50’s did not
believe that velocity was unstable, and Homer Jones said that Mints of the late 20’s
also emphasises the stability of velocity … Milton was fairly careful: he seemed to
argue that the only statements about the oral tradition which are to be taken seriously
are those at the beginning of the article, before he begins to number points. Thus he
would say that the oral tradition essentially was the approach that money matters, and
little more”.xxxvi
Friedman (1912-) was only a decade older than Patinkin (1922-95); but when the
1972 JPE symposium appeared (Gordon 1974), four decades had elapsed since he
attended Mints’ Economics 330. In contrast, Patinkin was in his mid-40s when he
became so agitated by what he perceived to be the conflict between his own memory
and Friedman’s introductory essay. He was in his mid-30s when he first noted and
commented (in correspondence and in conversation) on the discrepancy. As a
younger man in his prime, Patinkin was confident in the accuracy of his own
recollections and stated that Friedman’s account “strikes no response chord in my
memory” (Patinkin chapter 6 [1969/1981], 242). Friedman (to Patinkin 5 December
1968) was left wondering whether “I can trust my retrospective memory”.xxxvii
Perhaps Friedman was taken aback by the vehemence of the attack by someone he
regarded as a friend. In addition, Patinkin was an historian of economic thought;
Friedman was not. Indeed, Friedman (12 July 1951) described himself to Lionel
Robbins as “a tyro in the history of thought”.xxxviii Besides, the JPE symposium was
A Debate with His Critics (plural). Fischer (16 March 1971) reported to Patinkin that
Friedman indulged in “some minor grumbling about not having the time to be
involved in polemics”.xxxix This may explain why he did not examine his 330 lecture
notes or course outline. More importantly, in the early 1970s Friedman was entering
his period of peak influence: ‘The Transition from Fixed Exchange Rates to Money
Supply Targets’ (Parkin 1977).
8. Concluding Remarks
Memory, as Friedman has acknowledged, is not an entirely reliable source of
historical information (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 115, 123, 112). Patinkin (1976,
64) was also justified in concluding that “an author is not necessarily the best
authority on the history of the development of his own work; and by definition he
certainly is not an objective authority” [Patinkin’s emphasis]. However, the archival
material clearly indicates that Friedman’s account of the oral tradition contains a large
kernel of truth with respect to Mints in 1932, even though he may have exaggerated
the extent of this tradition by invoking the names of Knight, Simons and Viner.
Patinkin (1977, 125) regarded the history of economic thought as an “empirical
science” and suggested that a “regression line” approach was warranted. But when
Martin Bronfenbrenner disagreed with his evaluation of Simons’ influence, Patinkin
(chapter 5 [1969/1981], 246) noted that “Bronfenbrenner’s recollections refer to the
period 1934-36 whereas mine are for 1941-46” adding “I am not sure it is relevant”.
It was a reasonable first approximation for Patinkin to extrapolate backwards from
1944, although the presence of a structural break in 1936 rendered his extrapolation
unreliable. It was, in any case, an inadequate substitute for an examination of the
1932 archival material.
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Friedman (correspondence to the author 29 October 1999) regards “the fuss over the
Chicago oral tradition” as “much ado about very little” which has produced a lot of
“wasted paper”. But as Stigler (1988, 153-4) pointed out (in a brief reference to the
dispute over the oral tradition) Friedman was “quite talented in outraging his
intellectual opponents”. Moreover, Friedman used the quantity theory “as a powerful
weapon to attack the Keynesian theory”. Viner (chapter 46 [1936], 152) noted that
Keynes had identified liquidity preference as a “source of trouble” for the economy;
Friedman identified (apparently) stable money demand functions as a major source of
trouble for Keynesians.
Keynes (1922, vi) edited a series of books written by those who perceived themselves
to be “orthodox members of the Cambridge School of Economics”. Robertson (1922,
viii), the author of the handbook on Money, defended Keynes’ (JMK 11 [1911], 37576) assertion about the quantity theory “oral tradition” as “an almost pardonable
exaggeration”. Patinkin was not inclined to be so tolerant towards Friedman.xl To
Patinkin it was as if Moses had presented a ‘Restatement’ that perverted the wisdom
transmitted to him on Mount Sinai. The intensity of the resulting controversy can
only be adequately explained by reference to the passions engendered by the modern
configuration of economics.
Both sides of the Keynesian-monetarist debate claimed that the evidence supported
their conclusions in “a strikingly one-sided way” (Friedman 1963, 8; Desai 1981,
203). However, Patinkin performed a great service by undertaking such a one-sided
historical examination. Had he been more dispassionate, and not played the role of
‘economist-as-matador’ the dispute may never taken place and we would presumably
know a lot less about the evolution of monetary thought than we do today. Hence the
dispute over the oral tradition illustrates the pervasiveness of the principle of
unintended consequences. Patinkin, like Friedman, was “led by an invisible hand to
promote an end that was no part of his intention”.
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NOTES
i

Friedman’s lecture notes are currently in his possession and have not been processed
into his archives at the Hoover Institution.
ii

Stanley Fischer, his research assistant, wrote a memorandum for Patinkin in spring
1968 stating that “I’ve found no explicit mention of the demand for money” in
Simons’ writings. Don Patinkin Papers, Box 2.
iii

Don Patinkin Papers, Box 41.

iv

Don Patinkin Papers, Box 2.

v

Don Patinkin Papers, Box 3.

vi

Don Patinkin Papers, Box 32.

vii

Kahn (15 January 1933) wrote to Joan Robinson from Chicago: “The two
Commonwealth students are a terrific godsend to me. Boulding of Oxford is a nice,
unkempt kind of youth, and is regarded as good, particularly by Knight”. Richard
Kahn Papers, RFK/13/90/1/44-51.
viii

From the 1930s to at least the 1950s, Dennis Robertson examined Cambridge
undergraduates with questions about the relationship between the Treatise and the
quantity theory (Johnson 1975, 114).
ix

Gary Becker (1991, 144) recalled that as an Assistant Professor, he spent half his
time assisting Friedman in running the workshop; which involved he and Friedman
searching second hand stores for used Marchant and Monroe calculating machines for
graduate students to use.
x

“Being a student of Milton’s was magic indeed. People would always ask me, Why
are you so excited? Are you going out on a date with a beautiful woman? I said, no,
I’m going to a class in economics” (Becker 1998).
xi

One of the contributors to Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money criticised
Gardiner Ackley’s analysis of inflation and the theory of administered pricing. At the
“heart” of Selden’s (1959b, 455-6) criticism was that Ackley had failed to embed his
discussion within “the framework of generally accepted macro-tautologies”. Selden,
one of the self-confessed “reactionaries”, corrected Ackley’s supposed error by
analysing the issue through the quantity theory. This revealed that the traditional
theory of inflation was “alive and kicking”.
xii
xiii

Richard Kahn Papers, RFK/13/90/1/44-51.

Viner also advised the CEA about post war counter cyclical fiscal stabilisation
(Strayer 1950, 837, n14).
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xiv

One Mt Pelerin supporter, citing Viner, described the ‘Anachronism of the
Liquidity Preference Concept’ (Hahn 1947, 204, n3).
xv

In ‘Theory of the Firm and of Investment’ Hurwicz (1946, 131-2) stated that
Knight’s Risk Uncertainty and Profit had “served to give a more realistic theory of the
demand for cash, inventories and the like”.
xvi

Don Patinkin Papers: http://scriptorium.lib.duke.edu/economists/patinkin.

xvii

Cagan (13th April 1955) had highlighted an elementary error in Patinkin’s
reasoning about the relationship between prices and money during hyperinflation.
Patinkin (16th May 1955) informed Cagan that he “felt hopelessly stupid … All this
makes me now feel that I am missing the main point of your study. Maybe I’ll just
have to wait to read it in its entirety when it is published”. Don Patinkin Papers, Box
25.
xviii

In his discussion of real balances, Patinkin (1952, 269-70) raised “the interesting
question of how this set of forces, [emphasised by Haberler and Pigou] could have
been overlooked by Keynesian economists, in general, and Keynes himself, in
particular. Questions of this type can rarely be answered satisfactorily – and perhaps
should not even be asked. Nevertheless, I think it is both possible and instructive to
trace through the exact chain of errors in Keynes’s reasoning which caused him to
overlook these factors”. Keynes’ “fundamental error” related to the relationship
between real cash balances and consumption. Keynes erred by concentrating
“exclusively” on the tendency of real cash balances “to lower interest rates” through
the liquidity function. Patinkin then added a footnote: “the following passage [from
the General Theory] is especially interesting: ‘It is, therefore, on the effect of a falling
wage– and price-level on the demand for money [Patinkin’s emphasis] that those who
believe in self-adjusting quality of the economic system must rest the weight of their
argument; though I am not aware that they had done so’”. Patinkin concluded that
“looking back on the nature of these errors, we cannot but be struck by the irony that
they should have emanated from the man who did most to demonstrate the
fundamental inseparability of the real and monetary sectors of our economy”.
xix

On 19th April 1937, he wrote to Roy Harrod explaining that his review had stopped
a long way short of expressing his real anger (Besomi forthcoming).
xx

Eprime Eshag in his thesis on From Marshall to Keynes an Essay on the Monetary
Theory of the Cambridge School noted that “Keynes’ propositions on incentives to
liquidity were largely obtained from Marshall’s analysis of the demand for money”
(1963, 65; see also Bigg 1990, 99; Bridel 1987, 28, 130). Patinkin (chapter 36 [1974],
20, n17) disagreed with Eshag’s conclusions. Joan Robinson (1933, 77) complained
that the “simple minded reader [of the Treatise] finds that the Quantity Theory has led
him to concentrate too much on Demand”. George Shackle (1967, 215, 209)
concluded that the Treatise provided “a better account of liquidity preference, because
more impregnated with the feel of markets and their constant tip-toe alertness to every
breath of suggestion, than is to be found in the General Theory”. In Shackle’s
judgement, the Treatise was “in large part, an analysis of the economy’s total need for
a stock of money into various sources of demand”.
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xxi

On November 14th 1932, Keynes delivered a section of a lecture headed
“Parameters of the Money Economy”. In notes taken from these lectures, Robert
Bryce recorded: “Quantity [Theory] of Money [has] these [three] 3 fundamental
factors – of market and psychology and attitude to[wards] future liquidity preference,
expectation of quasi-rent – and state of time preference”. From Keynes’ lecture on
December 4th 1933, Lorie Tarshis recorded: “‘liquidity preference’- really the demand
for money – the way of summing up the eagerness of people to hold their wealth in
money rather than other forms … Motives for holding money, as in Treatise … We
now have the essential determinants of the rate of interest – A (L [iquidity]
Pref[erence]) – W (State of News) – M (Quantity of Money) … This is Keynes
‘quantity equation’ … Keynes thinks it best to relate M to [the rate of interest]”
(Rymes 1985, A39, J33, J36).
xxii

Pribram (1931, 62) also referred to Fisher’s (1926) “very interesting” ‘Phillips
curve’.
xxiii

Keynes may also have been stimulated by the assertion that “there is and can be
no economic Einstein” and by the statement that the “the pure doctrine of laissez-faire
had gone and we could no longer think in the abstract terms of Ricardo” (Phelan
1931, 155, 191). As he was pondering how to maximise the influence of the work
that would, from late 1933, be called The General Theory (second draft table of
contents), he met Albert Einstein, the author of another theory with a similar name
and a similar claim: “The old theory is a special limiting case of the new one”
(Einstein, cited by Clark 1984, 257). Keynes had used the Einstein analogy before
(JMK IX [1929], 91), and was aware of the rhetorical possibilities of presenting his
revolution as the social science equivalent of the revolution that had conquered the
physical sciences in the inter-war period: “The classical economists resemble
Euclidean geometers in a non-Euclidean world ... the postulates of classical theory are
applicable to a special case only and not to the general case, the situation which it
assumes being a limiting point of the possible positions of equilibrium ... We are thus
led to a more general theory which includes the classical theory with which we are
familiar, as a special case” (1936, 16, 3, vii).
xxiv

Currie (5 August 1971) explained to Alan Sweezy that his career had been blocked
at Harvard by Harold Burbank, Gottfried Haberler and Harris who “didn’t get on the
[Keynesian] bandwagon until it was perfectly safe to do so and he had his position
secured at Harvard”. Lauchlin Currie Papers, Correspondence, Alan Sweezy file.
Tavlas (chapter 34 [1997], 170, n10) recounts that Harris (whose surname was Cohen
before he changed it) was the only Jewish member of the Harvard Economics
department of the 1920s who received tenure.
xxv

There is a third 330 bibliography which obviously relates to a later version of the
course. Milton Friedman Papers, Box 5.
xxvi
xxvii

Don Patinkin Papers, Box 32.

In the third bibliography the entry reads “Fisher, Purchasing Power of Money,
chapters 1-6 and 8”. Thus it seems likely that Fisher figured slightly more
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prominently in the course from autumn 1932 onwards. Milton Friedman Papers, Box
5.
xxviii

The remaining sections of chapter 14 discussed the Fisher quantity equation and
its relationship with the Cambridge quantity equation.
xxix

Samuelson (1996, 148-9) stated: “it’s not true, I’ll say categorically, what Milton
Friedman at one time tried to sell: that there was a very subtle Chicago oral tradition
on the demand for money and monetary theory. Read Robertson’s handbook on
Money, and you will have plumbed the depths of Chicago’s monetary sophistication”.
xxx

Robertson (1928, 17) prefaced this chapter with the same words from Humpty
Dumpty that Patinkin (chapter 6 [1972/1974], 111) later used as the preface to his
assault on Friedman (When I use a word … it means just what I choose it to mean”).
xxxi

On Roosevelt’s inauguration day, 4th March 1933, thirty-eight states had closed
their banks and, for the first time since 1848, the Chicago Board of Trade shut its
doors (Leuchtenberg 1963, 39). Re-establishing confidence in the money supply and
the banking system was Roosevelt’s first priority. Friedman recalled that the collapse
of the monetary system and the associated calamities “did not pass unnoticed in the
Economics Department” (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 40). In April 1933, Knight
(1933, 244) wrote in the JPE that “the devil in person could not have invented a
device more obviously ‘intended’ than is commercial banking to increase the
amplitude of any incipient swing by an indefinite multiple”.
xxxii

Don Patinkin Papers, Box 2.

xxxiii

Don Patinkin Papers, Box 32.

xxxiv

Don Patinkin Papers, Box 32.

xxxv

Don Patinkin Papers, Box 2.

xxxvi

Don Patinkin Papers, Box 2.

xxxvii

Don Patinkin Papers, Box 32.

xxxviii

Friedman Papers, Correspondence, Robbins file.

xxxix

Don Patinkin Papers, Box 2. Perhaps Friedman was growing weary of his
opponents. On 30 December 1970, the New York Times reported that Johnson’s Ely
Lecture was an indication that Friedman’s influence over policy was waning (Silk
1970). In March 1971, Friedman had apparently just heard that Johnson’s Lecture
(chapter 8 [1971]) was to be published in both Encounter and the American Economic
Association Papers and Proceedings. The previous month, Murray Rothbard (1971,
3, 4) described Friedman as the “Establishment’s Court Libertarian … In many ways
we have Milton Friedman to thank for the present monster Leviathan State in
America”.
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xl

There are some similarities between Robertson’s relationship with Keynes before
and after the writing of the General Theory, and Patinkin’s relationship with
Friedman before and after 1956 (although Patinkin had never been Friedman’s student
or long term colleague). Patinkin (1980, 10) referred to the Keynes-Robertson
“vendetta” as “an originally close relationship steadily deteriorating over the years
into repeated disagreements, inability to communicate, and mutual distrust – all
exacerbated by deep emotional forces whose nature it is not for economists as such to
analyse” (see also Blaug 1986, 205; Danes 1987, 210). Earlier, Patinkin (1958, 3167) in his rather contemptuous account of the revival of the liquidity preferenceloanable funds dispute had referred to the “psychology of intellectual processes”. In
his History of Thought course at the University of Western Ontario, Patinkin
complained, or at least noted, that “economists seem to have some deep need to use
terms like ‘classical’, ‘neoclassical’, ‘Marxian’, ‘Keynesian’”. He also stated that
“tracing development of thought – how the mind works – history of ideas” was a
“Useless subject – you’ve been warned”. Don Patinkin Papers, Box 20 (see also
Backhouse 2002).

